Add one more hull to the familiar catamaran that sails up and down Pasig River and you have a trimaran, the next-generation vessel that can expand the ferry system to cover both Laguna de Bay and Manila Bay.
And amid a rough course to modernize a defense fleet, the versatile three-huller can also serve in other fronts such as coast guard duty or maritime police work.
Around the middle of the decade, mainland-based China Sate Shipbuilding and Trading Corp. has made headway in building, smaller and cheaper vessels outside the big-ticket range of a $2-billion destroyer or a budget-crunching $10-billion aircraft carrier.
The US Navy’s 3,000-ton LCS conceived in 2004 fetched $220 million a copy, outfitted with weapons, robotics and sensors.
If the first 13 orders are to make the shopping list, this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review should show more teeth in pursuing the LCS after General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin met rough seas on modified specifications and questionable contracts, turning out two trial versions at over P600 million a copy.
But China shipbuilders know what is at stake in its namesake sea, a jigsaw puzzle of cross claims by most countries in Southeast Asia, least of which is the Philippines.
On March 14, 1988, 20 months before the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the death knell of communism in Europe, Beijing and Hanoi sent their navies to the waters off our Kalayaan Island chain (part of the Spratly Archipelago) to seize seemingly insignificant lumps of coral jutting out of the waves.
But it wasn’t these calcified remains of billions of sea creatures the odd neighbors were after. It was what they believed lay buried 10 kilometers beneath these marine skeletons: the world’s fourth largest untapped reserves of crude oil and natural gas.
And there’s also the Spratly’s strategic value to world trade: global crude oil transits the South China Sea on which it sits. More than 60 percent of mainland oil exports are transported by water, mainly through the South China Sea.
The clash shores up the mainland’s superiority in what variously is called “Johnson South Reef Skirmish” or “The Spratly Islands Naval Battle of 1988” was hardly surprising because China and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago, and have garrisoned some of those coral lumps to reinforce their territorial claims.
Since three missile-armed Chinese frigates were up against three almost defenseless Vietnamese troop transport ships and three lightly-armed patrol boats, the result was never in doubt—two Vietnamese transports sunk, 60 dead versus six Chinese dead, all ships intact.
In today’s modern navies, the word “littoral” has become associated with the high technology navy of the future.
As early as 2004, Shanghai-based Quixin Shipyard completed four littoral combat ships of trimaran design for maneuvers close to shore.
Not to forget the Spratly foray before the turn of the century, the three-hullers have stealth capability, allowing them to skim as little as four meters of water.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy has embraced LCS as part of its force structure. It has Asia’s most numerous LCS fleet with over 40 of its Type 022 (Houbei-class) guided-missile fast attack craft launched and more orders lined up.
Type 022’s main armament is a twin-launcher for anti-ship, land attack or surface-to-air missiles. It can carry up to eight missiles.
Its bow mounts a turreted, six-barreled 30mm Gatling cannon for suppressing enemy shore fire or engaging small hostile aircraft such as helicopters, and adaptable to anti-submarine warfare.
These 220-ton cruisers clock about 40 knots on a power plant of twin diesel engine-driven water jets. The Huebei has a 12-member crew.
In the defense market, the multi-hull cruiser is cut out for the region, especially Asean-members whose territories consist of long and continuous shallow coastlines, inland lakes and river networks.
For good measure, the trimaran is built to do policing of exclusive economic zones exemplified by the re-aligned Philippine border based on the archipelagic doctrine.
The deadly flooding caused by storm Ondoy last September underscores transports slowly leaning on water routes especially in historically-inundated localities whose roads remained impassable for weeks.
To expand the ferry service while keeping tabs on Manila’s stake in Spratly and other parts of the national territory, missing on the trimarans can prove costly in the end. With Leo A. Estonilo
(Art Villasanta is an observer of military affairs, and is the Philippine historian of the Korean War. A professional writer and research consultant, he writes stories and special reports on business and industry. Archives and updates at: www.greatfilipino.blogspot.com and www.informationals.blogspot.com)
